We discuss a duel-type game in which Player I uses his resource continuously and Player II distributes it by discrete portions. Each player knows how much resources he and his opponent have at every moment of time. The solution of the game is given in an explicit form.
Introduction
The classical duel is a zero-sum game of two players of the following type. The players have certain resources and use them during a given time interval with the goal of achieving success. Use of the resource γ at the moment t leads to success with the probability depending on the amount of resource γ and the time t only (it is usually assumed that the probability of success increases with time). As soon as one player reaches the goal he receives his profit, which is equal to his opponent's loss, and the game ends. Various assumptions about the ways the players use their resources and about the players receiving information about the opponent's behavior during the game define various kinds of duels [1, 2] . Models were considered where the players' resources were discrete (discrete firing duels), infinitely divisible (continuous firing duels), continuous for one of the players and discrete for the other one (mixed duels, or fighter-bomber duels) [3, 4] . Researchers studied noisy duels [3, 5] , where every player at a given moment of time had complete information about his opponent's behavior up to that moment, and silent duels, where no such information was available. At the present time, duels are considered as classical models of competition [1, 6] .
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Posing the problem
We consider a zero-sum two-person game of the following structure. The players have resources a 0 and m 0 ( m ∈ Z ), respectively. The players use their resources during the time interval [0, 1] with the goal of achieving success. Player I has an infinitely divisible resource a ∈ R ; a > 0 , which he uses continuously. Player II has a discrete resource m ∈ N and uses it by units. The effectiveness of the j -th player using his resource is described by the function P j (t) ( j = 1, 2 ), which defines the probability of achieving success when using the unit of resource at the moment t . The functions P j (t) are called the effectiveness functions, they are continuously differentiable and increasing, P j (0) = 0 , P j (1) = 1 , P j (t) < 1 for t < 1 . Put p(t) = 1 − P 1 (t) , q(t) = 1 − P 2 (t) , P (t) = (P 1 (t), P 2 (t)) . The vectorfunction P (t) is called the effectiveness vector-function. The probability G(t, ∆γ) of achieving success when using the amount of resource ∆γ 0 at the moment t with the effectiveness function P j (t) is described by the formula [7, 8] :
∆γ , ∆γ > 0; G(t, 0) = 0.
If one of the players achieves success, the game stops. The profit of the jth player in the case of his success is equal to A j . Denote by A the pair (A 1 , A 2 ) . The players' profits are equal to 0 if none of them has achieved success or if success has been achieved by both of them simultaneously. Let α(t) , n(t) be the players' remaining resources at the moment t . Let us call the functions α(t) , n(t) the consumption functions of the players. They are nonincreasing, and n(t) is a step-function continuous from the left. The pair (α(t), n(t)) is called a play of the game. Assume that the function α(t) is continuous in [0, 1] and piecewise continuously differentiable in (0, 1) . Put ξ(t) = −α ′ (t) and name ξ(t) the intensity function. A time moment when a player uses his resource is called an action moment of this player. It is a decreasing point of Player I's consumption function ( ξ(t + 0) > 0 ) or it is a jump point of Player II's consumption function.
Let us compute the probability ϕ(α, t 1 , t 2 ) of Player I achieving success when using his infinitely divisible resource according to the consumption function α(t) at the time interval [t 1 , t 2 ] , assuming that Player II does not act during that period of time. By (1) we have:
where ξ(t) = −α ′ (t) . The probability ϕ(α, t 1 , t 2 ) of Player I achieving success in the segment [t 1 , t 2 ] can be expressed in terms of the consumption function α(t) as follows:
Let K(α, η) be the mathematical expectation of the profit received by Player I in the case when Player I uses his resource according to the consumption function α(t) and Player II uses his resource at the moments of time η k ( 1 k m ). It is computed in the following way. For m = 0 we have K = 0 if a = 0 and K = A 1 if a > 0 . For m 1 we obtain K(α, η) from the recursive formula
The game under consideration is called the noisy fighter-bomber duel. It is a model of competition in the conditions of complete information. In this game every player at a given moment of time has information about both player's resources up to that moment and continuously corrects his behavior on the basis of the received information about the present amount of his opponent's remaining resource. Player I's strategy is a function ξ = u(t, α, n) which determines the intensity of resource consuming ξ at a moment t in dependence of the current values of players' resources α and n . Player II's strategy is a function η n = v(α, n) assigning the moment of next action to a pair of players' current resources α and n . We will define the players' strategies in the segment where α(t)n(t) > 0 only and assume that if one of the players has not exhausted his resource then he consumes it so that the probability of his success is equal to 1 . By the condition P j (1) = 1 and formula (3), this is always possible. The payoff function of the game is the function K(ξ, η) defined by the formula (4), where ξ are η are the intensity function of Player I and the action moment vector of Player II realized during the game. Let us denote the game so described by G am (P, A) .
T -plays and T -strategies
Let us denote by T the set of all sequences of functions
satisfying the following conditions:
1. The functions T k (x) ( k ∈ N ) are defined and continuous in the halfline [0, +∞) , and continuously differentiable in (0, +∞) .
holds and for the action moments the inequality holds as an equality. Any sequence T ∈ T determines the set of all T -plays, which differ from each other in who of the players uses his resource at every action moment prescribed by the sequence T (simultaneous actions are possible). The Tplays (α j , n j ) ( j = 1, 2 ) in which the j -th player begins to use his resource after his opponents's resource has been exhausted are called the simplest T -plays. The consumption functions of the simplest T -plays have the form
makes the integral
Lemma 1. Let T ∈ T . The values of the payoff functions in all T -plays of the duel G am (P, A) coincide if and only if the following equations hold:
In this case the common value of the payoff function in all T -plays of the game is equal to
Proof. Necessity. Suppose that the values of the payoff functions in all T -plays of the duel coincide for a certain T ∈ T . Fix x ( 0 < x a ), k ( 1 k m ), and put t * = T k (x) . Denote the simplest T -plays of the game G xk (P, A) by (α j , n j ) ( j = 1, 2 ) and consider two T -plays (α j , n j ) ( j = 1, 2 ) of the game G am (P, A) satisfying the following conditions:
We denote the action moment vectors of the plays (α j , n j ) of the game G xk (P, A) by η j ( j = 1, 2). Let us compute the values of the payoff function in these plays:
By the assumption of Lemma the values of the payoff function of the game G am (P, A) in the plays (α 1 , n 1 ) and (α 2 , n 2 ) coincide. Hence the conditions (12)- (14) imply that the values of the payoff function of the game G xk (P, A) in the plays (α 1 , n 1 ) and (α 2 , n 2 ) are equal. Equating (15) and (16), we get (10). Sufficiency. Suppose that for a given T ∈ T the equation (10) holds for all 0 < x a , 1 k m . Let (α, n) be an arbitrary T -play. We need to show that K(α, n) = v m (a) . Proceed by induction in the number of units in Player II's resource. For m = 0 the statement of Lemma is true, as K = A 1 . Suppose that the equation holds for n k − 1 and prove it for n = k . Let η be the action moment vector of Player II in the play (α, n) . Set
where ϕ(α, 0, η k ) is the probability of Player I achieving success in the time interval [0, η k ) . By the formula (3) we have
It follows from the inductive assumption that
Substituting (18) and (19) into (17), we get
According to (10) we have
Taking into account (21), we finally conclude from (20) that
So the statement of Lemma has been proven by induction. 2
Let {T k (x)} ∈ T . The players' strategies having the form
where α , n are the players' remaining resources at a moment t , are called T -strategies.
Theorem 2. If a sequence {T k (x)} ∈ T satisfies the relations (10) for all 0 < x a, 1 k m , then any pair of T -strategies forms an equilibrium situation (saddle point) in the game G am (P, A) . The value of the game is given by the formula (11).
Proof. Let η be an arbitrary action moment vector of Player II. Suppose that Player I acts according to a T -strategy. His consumption function corresponding to η has the form
where
We will show that if T k (x) satisfies (10) for all 0 < x a, 1 k m then the inequality K(α T ; η) v m (a) holds. First let us notice that if Player I uses a T -strategy then the inequality η k > T k (α k ) is impossible, because starting from the moment T k (α k+1 ) Player I spends his resource according to the function α T k (t) making the identity t = T k (α T (t)) hold. In the result the next action moment of Player II prescribed by a T -strategy is being postponed.
If for all 1 k m one has η k = T k (α k ) then we are dealing with the simplest T -play (6) , and according to Lemma 1 the equation
If Player II spends his resouce before the next action moment T k (α T (t)) comes, then there exist two integers k and l ( 1 l k m ) such that
In this case, by the definition of a T -strategy, Player I's resource is not being consumed in the interval (η k+1 , T l (α k+1 )) , that is α T (t) = α k+1 . Define the vector η 1 as follows:
Let us compute K(α T ; η) and K(α T ; η 1 ) by presenting the payoff function as the sum of three summands corresponding to the intervals [0,
where 1] are the mathematical expectations of Player I's profit in the intervals [0, η k ) and [T l (α k+1 ), 1] when Player I's consumption function is α T and Player II's action moment vector is η , while Ψ(η k ) is the probability that for these consumption function of Player I and action moment vector of Player II both players did not achieve success up to the moment η k . Since the function q(t) decreases, comparing (25) with (26) and taking into account (23), (24) we get the inequality
Repeating the described procedure, we construct r vectors η 1 , η 2 , . . . , η r ( r < m ) such that
and η r i = T i (α i ) for all 1 i m.
According to Lemma 1, we have K(α T ; η r ) = v m (a) , and consequently K(α T ; η) v m (a) . Now let α(t) be an arbitrary consumption function of Player I and η T be the realization of Player II's action moment vector corresponding to α(t) for a T -strategy of Player II. Let us show that K(α; η T ) v m (a) . Denote the realization of Player I's consumption function corresponding to η T for a Tstrategy of Player I by α T (it is given by the formula (22)). If for all t ∈ [0, 1] such that α(t)n(t) > 0 the function α(t) coincides with α T (t) , then we are dealing with a T -play, and by Lemma 1 we have K(α; η T ) = v m (a) . Otherwise there exists t * ∈ [0, 1] for which α(t * ) = α T (t * ) and there exists ε > 0 such that for all t ∈ (t * , t * + ε) the inequality α(t) < α T (t) holds. The inverse inequality is impossible because Player II uses a T -strategy. Set 
; then by the definition of Player I's T -strategy we have t
by presenting the payoff function as the sum of three summands corresponding to the intervals
moreover, the inequality turns into an equality for t = t ′ 1 only. Using (32), one deduces (29) from (30) and (31). Comparing K(α; η T ) with K(α 1 ; η T ) (the formulas (27), (28)) and taking (29) into account, we get:
Repeating the described procedure, we construct a sequence of functions α k such that
Let α * (t) = lim k→∞ α k (t) . Passing to the limit for k → ∞ in the inequality (33) and using Helly's convergence theorem [9] we conclude that
Since α * (t) = α T (t) for all t ∈ {t : n(t) > 0} , by Lemma 1 we have
Corollary 3. If the function P 2 (t) strictly increases in the segment [0, 1] , then there exists at most one sequence {T k (x)} ∈ T satisfying (10) for all x 0 , k ∈ N .
Proof. Suppose there exist two sequences T 1 , T 2 ∈ T satisfying (10) for all x 0 , k ∈ N . Let l = min{k :
By Theorem 2 the game G al (P, A) has the value equal to the value of the payoff function in the T 1 -and T 2 -plays, that is the following equation holds:
But by the definition of l for all i < l one has
, hence using (35) and taking into account the strict monotonicity of the function P 2 (t) we conclude that T Let {T k (x)} ∈ T be a sequence satisfying the relation (10) for all a 0 and k ∈ N . Introduce the notation
Then
Differentiating (37) in x , we get
Let us write down the recurrence relation for π
It follows from (38) and (39) that the sequence {T k (x)} satisfies the system of ordinary differential equations
.
Lemma 4.
Assume that p(t) and q(t) are continuously differentiable in
Then the system of ordinary differential equations (40) under the initial conditions
has a solution in the half-line x > 0 ; moreover, {T k (x)} ∈ T .
Proof. Let us prove Lemma by induction in the number of action moments of Player II. The first equation of the system (40) has the form:
Integrating (42) under the initial condition T 1 (0) = 1 , we get:
The function T 1 (x) is the inverse function to x(T 1 ) . Let us check that it satisfies the conditions 1-4. First we have to show that T 1 (x) is defined in the half-line [0, +∞) . Choose δ > 0 such that − log p(δ) < 1 . Then
Since the right hand side of the inequality tends to +∞ as t → +0 , we have T 1 → +0 as x → +∞ and therefore the function T 1 (x) is defined for all x > 0 . According to the initial condition, T 1 (0) = 1 .
By (42), one has T ′ 1 (x) < 0 . So T 1 (x) decreases from 1 for x = 0 to 0 as x → +∞ . Hence 0 < T 1 (x) 1 .
Suppose that for 1 i k − 1 a solution sequence T i (x) of the system (40), (41) exists and satisfies the conditions 1-4. Substituting it into the k -th equation of the system (40), we get:
Let us show that the equation (44) under the initial condition
has a solution T k (x) , which satisfies the monotonicity condition
Note that the following inequalities holds for all x > 0 :
Indeed,
where π k (x) are the functions defined by the formulas (36). On the other hand, by the inductive assumption
hence (40) implies the inequality
Comparing (49) and (50), we obtain (48). Denote the numerator of the fraction in the right hand side of the equation (40) by F k (t, x) , that is
Next we will show that the equation
determines an implicit function t = f k (x) , which has the following properties:
1. the function f k (x) ( k ∈ N ) is defined and continuously differentiable in the half-line (0, +∞) ;
It follows from (48) that
On the other hand, for any x > 0
Therefore, for any x > 0 the equation (51) has a solution
To prove that the solution is unique let us check that
It follows from the implicit function theorem that the equation (51) determines an implicit function t = f k (x) , which is differentiable in the half-line
Taking into account the fact that, according to (38),
Since t < T k−1 (x) and T ′ k−1 (x) < 0 , it follows that (F k ) ′ x < 0 . It remains to check that f k (x) → 1 as x → +0 . It was proven above that f k (x) decreases monotonically in the half-line x > 0 . Taking into account the inequalities
we conclude that there exists a limit of f k (x) as x → +0 and lim x→+0 f k (x) = c 1.
Suppose that c < 1 . Substituting t = f k (x) into (51), we get:
As x → +0 , the right hand side of the equation (52) tends to −∞ , and the limit of the left hand side is equal to log p(c) > −∞ . It follows from this contradiction that lim
Now we are ready to proceed with the construction of the function T k (x) . Associate with any a > 0 the solutions y a (x) and z a (x) of the equation (44) in the half-line x a satisfying the initial conditions
This equation in the domain x > 0 , 0 < t < 1 satisfies the conditions of the theorem on the existence and uniqueness of solutions. By the inequalities (48) and f ′ k−1 (x) < 0 , the curves y a (x) and z a (x) for x > a are situated between the curves t = f k (x) and t = T k−1 (x).
Take c > 0 and denote inf Since F k (t, x) decreases in t for any x > 0 , one has
and thereforeỹ ′ (x) < 0 . Thusỹ(x) satisfies all the conditions imposed on the function T k (x) , and so the existence of this function is proven. Put
Lemma 5. Assume that p(t) and q(t) are continuously differentiable in
Then a solution of the system of differential equations (40), (41) is unique.
Proof. Let us proceed by induction. For k = 1 the function T 1 (x) is inverse to the function x(T 1 ) , which is determined uniquely by the formula (43). Suppose that for 1 i k − 1 the system (40), (41) has a unique solution T i (x) . Let us show that the problem (44), (46) has a unique solution. Let T k (x) be the solution of this problem constructed in Lemma 4 and y(x) be an arbitrary solution of this problem. We will show that
Consider two cases. Then, according to the above, y(x) satisfies the conditions (46), (47), and by Corollary 3,
2. For some x > 0 one of the inequalities
is false. We will show that in this case the curve y(x) does not go through the point (0, 1) , i. e., in this case the initial condition (46) is not satisfied.
(a) Suppose there exists x 0 > 0 such that y(x 0 ) < f k (x 0 ) . Then y ′ (x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, x 0 ) , and therefore y(x) < f k (x 0 ) for all 0 < x < x 0 , so in particular y(0) < 1 .
(b) Suppose there exists x 1 > 0 such that y(x 1 ) > T k−1 (x 1 ) . Then by the inequality (48) one has y(x) > T k−1 (x) for all 0 < x < x 1 . Since q ′ (t) is continuous and q ′ (t) < 0 for t ∈ (0, 1] , there exist two numbers c 1 and c 2 such that
It follows from the function F k (t, x) being monotonically decreasing in t together with the ineguality (48) that for t > T k−1 (x) one has
We find δ > 0 such that q(T k−1 (δ)) < c 1 /c 2 and put
holds, hence there exists ε > 0 such that for x ∈ (0, δ 1 ) the inequality y(x) − T k−1 (x) > ε is satisfied. Thus y(x) does not go through the point (0, 1) .
2
Remark 6. Suppose P 2 (t) = t ; and let y(x) , z(x) be the solutions of the equation (44) in the half-line [a, +∞) under the initial conditions y(a) = y 0 , z(a) = z 0 , where
Then the difference e(x) = y(x) − z(x) decreases in x .
Proof. Consider the derivative of the difference:
From the relation
, taking into account the inequality (F k ) ′ t < 0 obtained in the proof of Lemma 4, we get (Φ k ) ′ t < 0 for all x > 0 . Hence Φ k (t, x) decreases in t for any x > 0 . Since y(x) > z(x) , we have e ′ (x) < 0 and therefore the difference y(x) − z(x) decreases in x .
2
The next Theorem follows from Theorem 2 and Lemma 4.
Theorem 7. If in the noisy fighter-bomber duel the players' accuracy functions P j (t) ( j = 1, 2 ) are continuously differentiable in the segment (0, 1] ,
, then the game has an equilibrium situation (saddle point) in pure strategies. The value and the optimal strategies have the form:
where α , n are the players' remaining resources at the moment t , and {T k (x)} is a solution of the system of equations (40), (41).
Conclusions
1. The optimal strategies ξ T , η T prescribe the players to refrain from using their resources until the moment T m (a) (let us call it the good start-consume moment).
2. The good start-consume moment is a function T (α, β) of the current values α and β of the player's resources; it does not depend on the development of the game up to the current moment and is common for both players.
3. The more resources the players have, the earlier the good start-consume moment comes, because T k (x) decreases in x and k .
4. The optimally behaving players begin using their resources at the good start-consume moment (one of the players or both of them).
5. If at the good start-consume moment Player I starts to act according to the optimal consumption function, then he continues to act until the next Player II's action moment and during the whole of this period of time the following equation holds:
6. If at the good start-consume moment Player II acts, then his resource decreases by one unit and the players stop using their resources until the good start-consume moment corresponding to the current values of resources.
7. If Player I behaves optimally, the optimal strategy of Player II prescribes him to act at any moment when the equation (56) holds (possibly simultaneously with Player I, interrupting his actions), or to refrain from using his resource until the end of the game (moment t = 1 ), which does not affect the payoff.
8. If one of players uses a T -strategy, then a play is realized satisfying the condition t T m(t) (α(t)) for all t ∈ [0, 1] such that α(t)m(t) > 0 .
9. If both players act according to T -strategies, then they consume their resources only at those moments of time for which the equation (56) holds. In this case one of the T -plays is realized. The payoff function takes the same values at all of these plays.
Note that the sequence of functions T k (x) is a continuous analogue of the infinite matrix {t mn } ( m ∈ N , n ∈ N ) of "good first-shot times" of the noisy duel with discrete resources of both players [5] .
Appendix. Numerical solution of the game
We will consider the case when P 2 (t) = t , which does not restrict the generality. Indeed, let P 2 (t) ≡ t , P ′ 2 (t) > 0 and P 2 (t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, 1] . Let us make the change of variables τ = P 2 (t) and solve the game G am (P , A) , whereP = (P 1 (P −1 2 (τ )), τ ) . Obviously the values of the games G am (P, A) and G am (P , A) are equal and the optimal T -strategies of the game G am (P, A) are determined by the sequence T k (x) = P (40) has a singularity at the point x = 0 , and therefore it is impossible to solve the Cauchy problem for this system with the initial conditions at the point x = 0 . We will integrate the system (40) using the method described in the proof of Lemma 4, that is we will find solutions y k (x) and z k (x) of the equation (44) 
where δ k > 0 is a small number and f k (x) is the implicit function determined by the equation (51). The curves y k (x) and z k (x) (we call will them the kth upper and the k -th lower solutions) bound the desired curve from above and from below:
By Remark 6, the difference y k (x) − z k (x) decreases in x and therefore the following estimate holds:
From the continuity of the functions T k−1 (x) , f k (x) and the equations
To find the function T 1 (x) one needs to tabulate the function
and find the inverse function. Using the tabulated approximate values of the function T 1 (x) in the subsequent computations is undesirable, since in the computation of T 1 (x) in a neiborhood of the point x = 0 we lose precision. The right hand side of the system (40) does not depend on x explicitly. It depends on T k (x) only, so the change of variables u = T 1 (x) allows to solve the further equations of the system ( k 2 ) without using T 1 (x) . Set
Since T ′ 1 (x) → −∞ as x → +0 , passing to the variable u = T 1 (x) decreases the absolute values of derivatives of the functions we are looking for, which increases the precision of the computations. After the change of variables we get a system of differential equations in the segment [T 1 (a), 1] :
under the initial conditions
Suppose that the first k − 1 functions
under the initial conditionT k (1) = 1. After the change of variables, the initial conditions for the upper and lower curves take the form:
is the solution of the equatioñ Φ k (t, u k ) = 0 with respect to t . In view of the strict monotonicity of the function T 1 (x) , it follows from (58) that
Let us briefly describe a numerical algorithm for solving the game. The purpose of the algorithm is to compute the value of the game G ak (P, A) where P (t) = (P 1 (t), t) k = 1, 2, . . . , m and tabulate the functions T k (x) in the segment [a 0 , a] , a 0 > 0 with a given step h . The algorithm's work consists of two stages. Stage 1. Compute the values of the function T 1 (x) in the segment [a 0 , a] with the step h by solving the equation
where x(t) is the function defined by the formula 4. Tabulate the functionT k (u) by the formulã
, where
is the given precision.
5. Returning to original variable x , tabulate the function
6. Compute the value of the game v k (a) by the formula (54). 
. º p(t)¸q(t) (0, 1]p (0) = q(0) = 1 p(1) = q(1) = 0 p(t) > 0 t < 1 p ′ (t) 0 q ′ (t) < 0 º ´ ¼µ
.´ ¿µ
+ x(δ) = ln(1 − q(δ)) − ln(1 − q(t)) + x(δ).
(1 − q(T k−1 (x))) ln p(T k−1 (x)) q ′ (T k−1 (x))π k−2 (x) .´ ¼µ ´ µ ´ ¼µ¸ ´ µº ¸ ¹ ´ ¼µ F k (t, x)¸ º º F k (t, x) = (1 − π k−1 (x)q(t)) ln p(t) − (1 − π k−1 (x))q(t) ln p(T k−1 (x)).
